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NOTE AND COMMENT
Tm~ APPAJJI. CAs:e.-On :March 6 last the Supreme Court handed down
a unanimous decision in the appeals taken in the libel suits filed against
the Appam and cargo in the District Court of the United States for the
Eastern Di_strict of Virginia, affirming the decree of. restitution entered
by that court.
On February I, 19I6, the Appam, a British merchantman captured upon
the high seas on January IS by the German cruiser Moewe, arrived in
charge of a prize master and crew at Hampton Roads, Virginia, after a
voyage nearly twice as long as that to the nearest German port. The prize
master's commission authorized him to take the vessel to the nearest
American port and to lay her up. The German Ambassador in a letter of
February 2, notified the Secretary of State of the vessel's arrival and of
the intention of the commanding officer "to stay in an American port until
further notice." (Cf. IO AM. Joun. !NT. LAW (Supp., Oct., 1916), 387).
The modem practice of nations in dealing with prizes is for the captor
to take them for condemnation before a prize court sitting in his country.
It was formerly the custom for belligerents to bring prizes into neutral ports,
although it was clearly recognized that such entry, except under special
treaty stipulations to that effect, was accorded the belligerent not as of right,
but as a privilege at the discretion of the neutral. DAVIS, OuTLIN:es OF lNT.
'LAW, 26I-262; l\:foott, INT. LAw DIG., g83; Woor.s:ev, INT. LAW, 267; HAuT:e-

.MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
li'tUILLS, Dts DROITS '1!:r Dl':S Dr:voms Dl':S NATIONS N:r:uTRr:s r:N 'ttMl'S D:r;
GU£RRr: MARITIM:r;, 352. The whole trend of modern practice has been,
however, to limit this entry very strictly to certain well-defined cases. "The
modern practice of neutrals prohibits the use of their ports by the prizes
of a belligerent, except in case~ of necessity; and they may remain in the
ports only for the meeting of the exigency. The necessity must be one
arising from the perils of the seas, or. need of repairs· for seaworthiness, or
provisions and supplies. * * * In the list of necessities, the general danger
of a passage, from the vigilance or superioi:ity of the enemy, it would seem,
should not be included, although· no decision on that precise point is known."
Wm~A'tON, !NT. LAw (ed. Dana), 486-487 note; cf. also 2 On:r:Nm:rM, INT.
LAW (2d. Ed.), 395-396; ·HAI.L, TR:r:ATrs:r: ON INT. LAW, 623; DAVIS, op. cit.,
261-262; Mooa:r:, INT. LAW Dre., !)82, 985. Such has also been the practice
of the United States. Mooa:r:, OP.. cit., '936, 937, 938. The modern attitude
on this question is very clearly shown by the close restrictions of the provisions of Articles 21 and 22 of The Hague Convention XIII of 1907, adopted
by a large majonty~of' the nations, although not in force in the present
war. The Appam, therefore, as not being according to the well-substantiated
facts entitled thereto under any of the above .exceptions of necessity, had, it
is submitted, no right under the general principles of International Law to
entry into- a neutral American port.
The German Government rested 'i~s claim, however, upon what were
conceived to be the special privileges conceded to her by the provisions
of Article XIX of the Prusso-American Treaty of 1799, as renewed in 1828.
Cf. Letters of Feb. 2 and Feb. 22, 1916, from German Ambassador to
Secretary of State, in IO AM. JoUR. INT. LAW (Supp., Oct., 1916), 387,' 391;
also telegram from German Government, ibid., p. 390.
This treaty, originally negotiated in 1785, was entered into in 1799 and
renewed in 1828 by Prussia and the United States ; and although there is
in theory ground for the contention that treaties made by a component
state of the German Empire prior to the formation of the latter are not
binding upon the Empire, this Treaty has been frequently recognized as
valid and rights claimed and obligations performed under it. (Statement
of the German Foreign Secretary before the Reichstag, May 31, 1897.) Its
validity was officially recognized by Pntssia at the outbreak of the Civil
War in 1861, by the United States and the North German Confederation in
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, in the Lusitania Note of May 13,
1915, and in the Frye case in 1915. (Based on KRAu:r;t, EIN Vo:r:LK:r:RR:r:CHTLIClllm STRr:rTFALL, in KoHL:r:R, Z:r:ITSCHRIFT Fu:r:R Vo:r:LK:r:RR:r:CHT for January,
1916, pp. n-19.) In Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, the Supreme Court
recognized the continuous validity of treaties made by the United States
and the component states of the German Empire, the political departments
of both countries having previously decided such question in the affirmative.
The Appam, therefore, as a German prize seeking entry into a neutral
American port, was entitled to the enjoyment of such rights and privileges
of entry and of such only as are granted and contemplated by the provisions
of _Article XIX of that Treaty.
·

NOTE AND COMMENT
The Treaty with Prussia was one of a series of commercial treaties
made by the United States with the leading maritime states of Europe-with
France in 1778, with Holland in 1782, with Sweden in 1783, with England
-in 1794- In these treaties, except that with Holland, the reception of prizes
in the ports of the neutral is regulated by provisions of the same general
tenor, the differences being in the main in phraseology. On August 28,
18o1, President Jefferson wrote to Gallatin about the French Treaty, "The
treaties give a right to armed vessels, with their prizes, to go where they
please (consequently into our ports), and that these prizes shall not be
detained, seized, nor adjudicated, but that the armed yessel may depart
as speedily as possible, with her prize, to the place of her commission. *
These stipulations admit the prizes to put into our ports in cases of necessity,
or perhaps of convenience, but no·right to remain if disagreeable to us; and
absolutely not to be sold." Mooiu:, op. cit, VII. 936. It would seem, then,
that the interpretation put by the Secretary of State upon Article XIX as
providing only temporary asylum for prizes under convoy by the captor
vessel is in strict accord, not only with the general practice of the United
States, but also with the interpretation officially put by the Government upon
similar treaty provisions from the beginning. Cf. Letters of March 2 and
of April 7, 1916, from Secretary of State to German Ambassador, in AM.
}OUR. INT. LAW, X, Supp., Oct, 1916, pp. 393-395, 401-403. The German
Government protested against this "especialy strict interpretation" of the
Treaty, urging the facile· contention that the modem practice of naval
warfare should modify the strict terms of the stipulation so as to permit
entry of unconvoyed prizes in conformity with modem methods of sen.ding
prizes to the home port under a prize crew. German Memorandum of
March 16, 1916, in AM. }OUR. INT. LAW, X, Supp., Oct, 1916, pp. 397-399.
A treaty is in essence a bargain whereby the contracting parties seek to
accommodate their aims and interests in such fashion as will secure to
each the greatest amount of advantage possible. Provision is balanced
against provision, and it is submitted that no unilateral extension of the
strict terms of any provision can be admitted under the general principles
of treaty construction (cf. Woor.s:EY, INT. LAW, pp. 185-186), a restriction
of all the greater force when it is borne in mind that. the. provision thus
proposed to be extended in the face of an acceptance of over a century
under the possibifity and the right of abrogation. on a year's notice at any
time the strict provisions of the treaty should prove unsatisfactory, was in
itself originally a modification of the practice, if not of the rule, of International Law, a practice whose aim and purpose have been but fortified
and strengthened in the later development of that science.
The determination of political questions lies within the realm of the
political department of the government, whether of the executive or legislative branch, and that decision is not subject to review by ~he courts. Cf.
Mooiu:, op. cit, V. 241-242, and cases there cited. The Supreme. Court in
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (SCOTT, CAs:Es, p. 40), held that the
determination of sovereignty by the political department was binding upon
the judges, other officers, and citizens. Cf. other cases there cited. Other
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cases are The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 665; Fifield v. Ins. Co., 47 Pa. St. 166,
172 in Scott's Cases; also Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, where it was
held that the decisions on foreign relations made by the political department
were binding upon the country. (SCOTT, CAsts, p. 728, 729.) The court
held in re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 502-505 (Mooll, op. cit., V. 744), that
there could be no judicial review of the action of the political department
upon such questions, basing its opinion upon Willia111s v. Suffolk Ins. Co.,
3 Sumner, 270, and other cases there cited. In North American Commercial
Co. v. Ut1ited States, 171 U. S. IIO, the i:ourt recognized the arbitral award
and the correspondence of the government as binding upon it. In the
matter of the interpretation of treaties the courts are bound by the known
decisions of the political department; and this principle is more clearly
se.en where the interpi;etation put upon the treaty by the political department has been set forth in the course of diplomatic reclamation. In Foster
v. Neilson,· 2 Pet. 253, "the court refused to go into the merits of the
treaty, . holding itself bound by the decision of the political department of
the government. * * * 'We tliink, then, however individual judges might
construe the Treaty .of St. Ildefonso, it is the province of the court to conform its decisions to the will of the legislature, if that will has been
clearly expressed.'" Scott, CASts, pp. 75-76. Nor can the Supreme Court
enforce a. treaty, if .the government decides to disregard it. Botiller v.
Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238, and other cases there cited, in Mooll, op. cit.,
V. 243. 'In the principal case Waddili, J., said, "The weight that should
be given to the opinion and ruling of the secretary of state * * * in construing the Prussian treaty, need not be dwelt upon * * * .further than
to say that it bas special significance as a decision and ruling of the executive Qranch of the government, having to do with international matters,
invoked by the German government, in this very matter.'' 234 Fed. 396.
'fhe interpretation put upon the Prussian Treaty by the Secretary of State
was, therefore, binding upon the courts. Since by that interpretation the
Appam had no right to entry under the circumstances, such entry consituated a violation of American neutrality; and the courts, ,called upon in
the libel suits to take cognizance of the case, had to proceed to judgment
accordingly.
"'\Vhen a captured vessel is brought or voluntarily comes infra praesidia
of the neutral power, that power has the right to inquire whether its own
neutrality has been violated by the capture, and if so it is bound to restore
the property.' La Estrella, 4 Wheaton 298; La Amistad de Rues, 5 Wheaton
385; Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dallas 157; Betsey Cathcart, Bee. 292." HALL, INT.
LAW, p. 625; cf. also HAuTtl!tUILLt, op. cit., L 36o-361. In the past, it is
true, but two main classes of such cases have come up for adjudication,
captures in neutral territory, and captures by vessels fitted out in neutral
ports (cf. HALL, op. "cit., pp. 624-:625; La Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton
283) ; but it is submitted that it is the fact of the violation of neutralityand not the manner of the violation, which is conceived to be a question
of quite secondary importance-which entails the penalty. The Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax held in the case of The Chesapeake that "for a
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belligerent to bring an uncondemned prize into a neutral port to avoid recapture [as seems to have been the motive in the principal case] is such
a grave offense against the neutral state that it ipso facto subjects the prize
to forfeiture, and * * * the vessel should be restored to the owners on
the payment of costs." MooRt, op. cit, VII. 937. The holding of the court
was, therefore, in line with the rulings and practice of over a century.
Although the Supreme Court did not in the opinion handed down in
the principal case expressly recognize that the interpretation put upon the
Treaty by the political department of the government in the course of
diplomatic reclamation was binding upon the courts, it is submitted that
that principle governed in arriving at the decision.
H. e. S.
ENJOINING AN F~10N A't 'tHl': Sux-r or TAXPAn:R.-It is commonly
stated that equity has not power to enjoin an election. McCRARv, ELi;:c-r10NS,
3rd Ed. §351. This statement cannot be taken without some qualification.
When the election is being held under a valid~law, the requirements of which
are observed, there can be no doubt but that the injunction should be refused. The question in such a case is a poltical one and equity will not
interfere to decide questions which are truly of a political nature. Morgan
v. Wetzel County Court, 53 W. Va. 3721 44 S. E. 1&l; Oden v. Barber, 103
Tex. 4491 129 S. W. 6o2. But in cases where the election is to be held
under an unconstitutional law, most of the cases hold that equity has jurisdiction to enjoin. Mayor, etc. of Macon v. Hughes, uo Ga. 795, 36 S. E.
247; Connor v. Gray, 88 Miss. 4891 41 So. 186 (senible); contra, Illinois v.
Galesburg, ~ Ill. ~5: The question in such a case is certainly a judical
one and is capable of being tried by a court of equity.
In a recent case, Power v. Ratliff (Miss. 1916), 12 So. 864 which was
a combination of two suits to enjoin the submission to the vote of the people of a prohibition law and a law providing for the appointment of game
wardens, the relief was denied. In both suits the plaintiffs contended that
the constitutional amendment which allowed a re(erendum was void· because
not regularly passed. It was stated in the dissenting opinion that the
amendment was clearly invalid because of the method of its adoption and
this is tacitly adipitted in the prevailing opinion, which however did not
consider this point. The majority opinion disposes of the case upon two
grounds: one, that these particular plaintiffs have not sufficient interest in
the r~sult to complain; two, that equity has no jurisdiction to grant the
relief demanded. Having disposed of the first point, the decision on the
second is unnecessary and is hence mere obiter dictum.
However, the question of jurisdiction is an interesting one. It is of
course, weli settled that equity will not enjoin the passing of an act by the
legislature even though the act would be clearly unconstitutional if passed.
McChord v. Louirville and N. R. Co., 183 U. S. ~3, 22 Sup. Ct. 165, 46 L.
Ed. 28g; New Orleans Water Works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 4711
17 Sup. Ct 161, 41 L. Ed. 518. .This position is taken in order to prevent
judicial interference with the functions of the legislature; there is also
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an .efficient remedy after the legislation is passed. This objection does not
apply to an injunction against the submission of a measure under a referendum law. There is no interference with· the functions of a coordinate
branch of the government. The legislature has already completed its action.
The submission of a· measure to vote of the people cannot be regarded as
an act of the legislature. The referendum vote is the act of the people
and not of the legislature: there is no political objection to enjoining such
an election if the provision under which the election is held, is unconstitutional An injunction against the election in the principal case would prevent an illegal, useless and expensive act without jarring the fine mechanism
o~ our tri-branched system of. government. If no political question is involved in the granting of the injunction it is difficult to see why a court
of chancery cannot enjoin an illegal election.
There is another question involved in the Power case, namely what interest is sufficient upon the part of the plaintiff to entitle him to an injunction against an election. The first bill was brought by two taxpayers.
'The submission o the voters was to be at a regular election and so the additional expense and the additional tax burden on the plaintiffs was insignificant. That a taxpayer is entitled to an injunction against an illegal
election has been affirmed in: Mayor, etc. of Macon v. Hughes, supra;
De Kalb County v. City of Atlanta, 132 Ga. 727, 65 S. E. 72; and denied in
Roudanea v. New Orleans, 29 La. Ann .. 271; M cAlister v. Millwee, 31 Okla.
62o, 122 Pac. 173, 40 L. R. A. N. S. 576. The principal case is clearly distinguishable- from Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, in which case the court
iienies equitable relief to secure to the plaintiff his right to vote and be
voted for. The rights insisted upon in the Fletcher case are political ones
and whether.equity should protect these rights depends in a large degree upon
whether such rights are regarded as being civil as well as political as in
the leading case of Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 950. There is conflic~
as to whet4er the latter case is l~w in this country-the state courts are
at variance on this point. Surely in those jurisdictions which recognize the
doctrine of Ashby v. White, equity should protect the right to vote. The
doctrine of the Fletcher case, however, has no application to the principal
case.
It was pointed out in People v. Galesburg, supra, that in t4e case of an
invalid election of officials, there is an adequate remedy at law, i. e., by
resorting· to the common law writ of quo warranto. But such a writ does
not take care of the situation in the Power case. Moreover even where the
election is of officials, the writ would not prevent the imposition of taxes
to pay for the expenses of the election. Some of the courts intimate that
equity should not enjoin the election, but only enjoin the payment of expenses of tht: same. But why wait? It would be safer and more sensible
to enjoin the election in the first instance. The court in the Power case in.,
tima~es that if tlie proposed election authorized bond issues, or directly
affected plaintiffs' property rights, it would consider that the plaintiffs were
in a position to complain. But there are property rights involved ; in particular instances, the additional tax resulting from the expenses of the
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illegal election might be considerable. It is true that Judge Cooley said in
Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 549, that a single taxpayer has no right to complain until the amount is assessed against him. The learned judge bases
his argument upon public policy; the public welfare demands that a whole
assessment should not be enjoined. It is inconceivable that he would apply
the rule to such a case as the principal one. Surely it does not interfere with
the public welfare to enjoin an election which is useless at the best. Even if
each taxpayer would have a remedy at law for the recovery of taxes which
he was wrongly forced to pay, equity should grant an injunction to prevent
multiplicity of suits. This point is developed in Mayor, etc. of Macon v.
Hughes, supra. This much cannot obe doubted: that equity has jurisdiction
to enjoin an election which is clearly illegal; that it can do so at the suit
of a taxpayer without doing violence to the theories upon which equity
grants relief; and that in so doing a desirable result is obtained without
interfering with political affairs.
T. E. A.

. WHA'r Savicii Gms JURISDICTION IN PttsoN.-On March 6th, 1917, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of McDonald v. Mabee,
reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, in 175 S. W. 676, held
that a judgment in foreclosure proceedings in which the defendant was
served only by publication did not merge the cause of action so as to bar
a suit on the original notes for the balance unpaid by the sale of the mortgaged property on the foreclosure, although the statute of the state declared
such service sufficient to give jurisdiction in personam, and the defendant
was a citizen of the state and bound by the law so far as it was constitutional.
The only case in the United States squarely sustaining the Texas decision
on similar facts, so far as the writer is aware, is the often cited case of
Henderson v. Staniford (1870), 105 Mass. 504 7 Am. Rep. 551, in which it
was held that action on the original cause was barred by the plaintiff recovering a judgment in a suit in California, where the parties resided, and
in which the defendant was served only by publication. The court said
that if the service so made was defective the defendant could waive the
defect, and did so by urging the judgment as a defence. It is no doubt
true that a defendant can waive service by appearing in the suit, as is
done every day; but this defendant did and proposed no such thing; and
no appearance by him even if made could cure the defect unless such appearance were entered before judgment, so as to confer jurisdiction on
the court to render the judgment. That a judgment recovered by such
service was no bar, and was not available as a defence against a new action
on the original cause, had, at the time this decision was rendered, been
held in other states. Whittier v. Wendell (1834), 7 N. H. 257; Middlesex
Bank v. Butman (1848), 29 Me. 19. Thus considered, the decisiort of the
Supreme Court of the United States in McDonald v. Mabee would seeI'll
to affirm a doctrine sufficiently clear on principle to require neither proof
nor precedent to support it, were it not for the decisions to the contrary cited.·
But these decisions are nat so contrary as they seem; fol' they were rendered·
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on the assumption that such a service gives jurisdiction, and it is in that
regard that the present case is of the greatest interest.
The notion has persisted in many quarters that statutes may enable
courts to acquire jurisdiction to give judgments in personam against persons who have neither appeared nor been served with personal notice within
the jurisdiction to appear and defend, whereby to put them in default.
There are the cases of Lucas v. Wilson (1881), 67 Ga. 356, and Hulbert v.
Thomas (1887), 55 Conn. 181, 10 Atl. 556, 3 Am. St. Rep. 43, in which
judgments rendered on such service were affirmed in the Supreme Court
because the requirements of the statute had been complied with, no inquiry
being raised as to whether or not the statutes were constitutional. Then
there are such cases as Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1907), 225 Ill.
i97, 8o N. E. 109, in which it was held that judgment against a corporation
on such service was good beeause such was the service provideq by the
statute, and the defendant by citizenship is bound by the laws of the state.
The facts are that the defendant was an Illinois corporati9n, agreeing to be
bound by such service by copsenting to be a corporation under that .law,
and therefore bound by the agreed method of service. The same would be
true if it were a foreign corporation and accepted the .permission given by
the state to do business in the state on condition of consenting to accept
service of that sort. The same would be true of a natural person who gives
a judgment note,. providing that if not paid when due the payee may appoint
an agent to app~r and confess judgment against the maker to the amount
of the note, interest, and costs. Such a judgment is valid, not because the
legislature could legalize such a method of· service, but because the party
has expressly agreed to be bound by such service. It has been suggested
that the same logic applies to natural persons, that by consenting to be
citizens of the state they agree .. to be bound by its laws; but that is not
true, they are citizens whether they will or no. We· were not consulted as
to who~ we would .choo:;e for parents or where we preferred to be born,
assuming that we could have made a legal choice at that time. Even Mr..
Justice Field's concession in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. ~14. 735, that
a statute of a state providing that non-residents doing a partnership business
in the state should be bound 'by indirect service, has since been repudiated,
because such legislation denies equal protection of the law. Fle~er v. Farson (1915), 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327.
In the English courts it is quite clearly established that legislation providing for less than per~onal notice to confer jurisdiction in personam is
valid, and will be given effect. Thus there is the leading case of Douglas v.
Forrest (1824), 4 Bing. (13 E. C. L.) 686, an action on a Scotch judgment
against a Scotchman, in which it was held that a service consisting only of
calling him in open court, at separate terms, to appear and calling in public
in the market-square of Edinburgh and ·at the sea-shore after he had gone
to India, was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render judgment
against him' in personam which would sustain an action of debt in England,
because the service was according to the law of Scotland, to which the de.;
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fendant owed allegiance. Again, in Bocquet v. MacCarthy (1831), 2 Barn. &
Ad. (22 E. C. L.) 951, it was held that a statute of a British colony providing that in all actions against an absent party process might be served by
delivering the same to the king's attorney, without requiring him to forward
it to the party, was not so repugnant to the principles of natural justice as
to prevent the English court maintaining an action of debt on a judgment
rendered by a court of the colony against a citizen of the colony on such
a service. The same has been held in an Irish court of a French judgment
bf France: Maubourquet v. Wyse (1867), I Ir. Rep. C. L. 471.
But the writer has always maintained that these decisions do not express the accepted law of the United States, and that here no state can
confer on its courts jurisdiction to render judgments in personam on any
less service than personal service on the party to be charged, and that
within the confines of the state. This view is supported by the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, first in the case of Webster v. Reid
(1850, I I How. (52 U. S.) 437, in which plaintiff claimed title to land
by sale under execution on a judgment recovered for se~ce of the commissioners appointed to partition the half-breed Indian lands, n9,ooo acres.
The commissioners not being paid for their services sued "The Owners of
the Half-Breed Indian Lands," had process sen•ed by publication according
to the law of the territory, took judgment for the amount of their services,
had execution levied on all the lands, had them sold, and Reid claimed title
by virtue of such sale. The court held the judgment and sale void, and
Mr. Justice McLean in giving the opinion of the court said: "These suits
were not a proceeding in rem against the land, but were in personam against
the owners of it. Whether they all resided within the territory or not does
not appear, nor is it a matter of any importance. No person is required to
answer in a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property
has not been attached. In this case there was no personal notice, nor an
attachment or other proceeding against the land until after the judgments.
The judgments, therefore, are mere nullities and did not authorize the
executions on which the land was sold." The observation ·that the rule is
the same as to citizens and non-residents is worthy of particular note; and
the same sentiment was emphatically repeated by Mr. Justice Field in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714 But because the defendant in that case
happened to be a .non-resident, .many persons have said the decision Inight
have been different had the defendant been a citizen of the state, basing
their opinions on the English decisions above referred to, and the notion
that the state may provide some substitute for personal service in the case
of its own citizens. This qualification has been most explicitely denied in
the Supreme Court of California in DeLaMontanya v. DeLaMontanya (18g6),
u2 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345, 53 Am. ·st. 165, 32 L. R. A. 82, holding void a
decree for alimony and custody of children against a citizen of the state ·
on service by publication according to the requirements of a statute declaring
that such service should be sufficient to give jurisdiction in personam; and
similar rulings have been made in other states: Rahar v. Rahar (19n), 150
Iowa 5II, 129 N. W. 494 Ann. Cas. 1912D, 68o; Moss v. Fitch (1go8), 212
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Mo. 484, III S. W. 475, 126 Am. St. 568. In Smith v. Grady (1887), 68.
Wis. 215, 31 N. W. 477, it was held that a, judgment against a citizen of
Ontario rendered on service on the debtor personally in the state of Wisconsin, in compliance with the laws of Ontario was not entitled to respect
sufficient to prove a claim against the estate of the defendant therein in the
probate courts of \Visconsin. In Grubel v. Nassauer (1913), 210 N. Y. 149,
103 N. E. u13, it was held that an action was not maintainable on a judgment rendered by a court of the German Empire against a citizen of Germany
on service according to the law of that country, after he had sailed to
America.1

1 In Wilson v. Seligman (1892), 144 U. S. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. 541, after return of
execution unsatisfied against a corporation, an order was made on motion, according
to the provisions of the statute of the state, that execution issue against the
stockholders, including defendant as one, and notice of this motion was personally
served on him outside of the state; be did not appear, aµd on default an order
was mllde finding him to be a stockholder and liable for the judgment, and awarding
execution against him. The statute required "sufficient notice in writing to the
persons sought to be charged." On this order action was brought against the
defendant in this case, and judgment for defendant was affirmed on writ of
error to the Supreme Court of the United States. GRAY, J., • • • "In the case
at bar the defendant never resided in Missouri, and was not served with process
within the state, either upon the original writ against the corporation or upon the
motion for execution against him. He· denies that he was a stockholder; and
the question whether he was one was not tried or decided in the controversy
between the plaintiff and the corporation, nor involved in the judgment recovered
by one of those parties against the. other. Under the statute of Missouri, and upon
fundamental principles of jurisprndence, 'be is entitled to legal notice and trial
of the issue before he can be charged with personal liability."
Amsbaugh v. Eschange Bank of Maquoketa (1885), 33 Kan. 100, 5 Pac. 3$.i,
was an action on two judgments rendered against defendant in the circuit court
of Jackson County, Iowa, on process served there on defendant's wife at the
house where be bad resided, a week after his departure with intent never to return.
He left November 4' and the processes were served November 12 and 14 following.
Judgment for plaintiff reversed on error, because jtidgments were void. The
court held that a judgment rendered on such service was not entitled to any
respect in any other state even if the service was according to the law of the
state where it was rendered; because defendant bad abandoned his residence
before process was served, and. therefore was beyond the jurisdiction.
Ross v. Fitch· (1908), 212 Mo. 484' III S. W. 475, 126 Am. St. 568, was a
decree for divorce, alimony, and custody of children, on process served only
on defendant personally in another state, according to the law of' this state; and
sale of land on execution thereon. The divorce purchaser at the sale sued to clear
the title. GRAVES, J. "To our mind the legislature had no intent of giving the
service in section 592 a broader scope than that of publication, but was simply
providing another method of accomplishing the same thing; i. e., giving some kind
of a notice that the court had seized the res, whether that res was property or
the inarriage status, and would proceed to determine the rights of the parties
tn and to the res•• • • • We repeat that, whatever may be the holdings elsewhere,
our court place$ the acquisition ot jurisdiction upon which a penonal judgmeut
can be rendeted upon the fact of personal service of the party with process in
this state. In other words, 110 process issued by the courts of this state a11d
served upon the party defendant in another state can be the basis of a personal judg·
ment. And this is true whether the parly in fact is a citizen of this stale or of
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In rendering the opinion in the case of McDonald v. Mabee, Mr. Justice
Hor.MES makes a concession not heretofore admitted by the Supreme Court
of the United States, that something a little short of personal service might
constitute due process of law, within the protection of he constitution. This
concession may be due to the fact that there are to be found on the statute
books of nearly all the states provision for service of process by leaving a
copy at the residence of the defendant with some member of the . family
:if suitable age and discretion. Mr. Justice Hor.MES says: "Perhaps in
·view of his technical position and the actual presence of his family in the
state a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would have been
enough. * * * It is going to the extreme to hold such power gained by
service at the last and usual place of abode." · The writer is not aware of
any case in which the constitutionality of a statute providing for acquisition
of jurisdiction by such mode of service has yet been sustained.
J. R R

Pow:ER ol' A NA'l'IONAL BANK 'l'O FouND A PSNSION FUND FOR EMPI.O\'SSS.Within the last decade in the United States there has been a marked increase in the profit sharing plans, the pension plans, and the general welfare
work done by business corporations for their employees. Whether this has
been due more to beneficent motives than to pure business foresight it is
evident that many business men consider such investments good ones for a
corporation from a purely financial viewpoint. "The pension plan attaches
the employees to the service and decreases the liability of a strike * * * it
makes more certain the continuance of efficient men in the lines of work
with which they are familiar * * * the incentive to good conduct is greatly
increased." F. A. V AND:ERI.IP, quoted in SQUI:ER, Or.D Acs DsPSNDENCY IN 'l'Ht
U:t·.-X'l'SD S'l'A'l'SS. Ch. III. Although there has been considerable debate concerning economic aspects, it does not appear that the question whether such
work is ultra vires the ordinary business corporation has been much before
the courts.
In Hein:: v. National Bank of Commerce (1916), 237 Fed. 942, the
Federal Court of Appeals had to determine whether a national bank had
the power to provide a pension fund for its officers and employees. The
shareholders had authorized the directors to create such a fund, but it was
contended by the plaintiff, a shareholder who asked an injunction against
the payment of a lump sum agreed upon in lieu of the pension granted to
a retiring president of the bank, that the bank was wholly without power
to found such a fund, and hence as the provision was ultra vires and void,
the contract to pay the agreed sum was without consideration. In reaching
its conclusion the court considered that the judgment of the stockholders
and directors, though not conclusive, was entitled to some weight on the
question whether such action was within the implied powers of the bank.
It recognized that such plans were deemed good business policy in effecting
an increase in the character of the service and the loyalty of the .employee$,
and held that the power to create such a fund as a business detail was
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included in the clause of the National Banking Act "and all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."
It is well settled that the test of whether a power is impliedly granted
to an ordinary business corporation is whether it is one reasonably incident
to and necessary to the carrying out of the express powers granted. THOMPSON, CoRFoRATioNs, §21o8, and cases cited, and where the exercise of the
power is unchallenged by the state and not prohibited by its charter or the
corporation laws of the state, if it has a reasonable tendency to aid in the
accomplishment of one or more of the corporate purposes it will be held
intra vires. Colo. Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 Fed. 843, 38 C. C. A. 433.
It need be necessary only in the sense of being appropriate, convenient, and
suitable-including a right of reasonable choice of the names to be employed.
Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Capital Dairy Co., 6o Oh. St.¢, 53 N. E. 7u; Flaherty
v. Portland etc. Society, 99 Me. 253, 59 Atl. 58; State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L.
537; Malone v. Lancaster Gas etc. Co., 182 Pa. St. 309, 37 Atl. 932; 3 THOMPSON, CoRPORATIONS, §2IIO and cases cited. In Jacksonville etc. Ry. Co. v.
Hooper, l6o U. S. 514 40 L Ed. 515, it was said: "This doctrine ought to
be reasonably and not unreasonably understood and applied, and whatever
may fairly be regarded as inCidental to, or consequential upon those things
which the legislature has authorized ought not, unless expressly prohibited,
to be held by judicial construction to be ultra vires." See Atfy Gen. v. Great
Eastern Ry., 5 App. Cas. 473. That the modem tendency of the great majorify of courts is in this direction, see l CooK, CORPOllATIONS, §3 and cases
cited.
National banks are corporations of limited capacity having no powers
except such as are given them expressly or by necessary implication by the
Acts of Congress passed in relation to such banks. Calif. Nafl Bank v.
Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 42 L. Ed. 198; Nafl Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S.
67, 35 L. Ed. 107; Bailey v. Farmer's Nafl Bank, 97 Ill. App. 66: 7 C. J. 807.
The statute provides that. national banking associations may exercise "all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking." U. S. R.£\r. STAT., §5136 (7). These incidental powers so granted
have been interpreted to mean those incidental to the things authorized by
the Banking Act and not such as are incidental to the banking institutions
generally. Seligman v. Charlottesville Nat. Bank, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,642,
3 Hughes 647. It is evident, however, from the decisions construing this
clause, that the courts do not understand that this limitation is to be so interpreted as to prevent a national bank from operating according to recognized
good business principles unless it is very clear that such was intended to be
prohibited. The courts will not prevent a national bank from being a good
business man except on clear grounds. Accordingly although the Banking
Act expressly prohibits a national bank from purchasing or dealing in the
stock of other corporations (National Bank v. Hawkins,_ 179 U. S. 364, 43
L. Ed. 1007; Calif. Nafl Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 462, 42 L. Ed. 198),
yet such prohibition bas been construed to apply to dealing in the sense of
speculation, and it has been held that a national bank may loan money on
stock as security (Calif. Naf~ Bank v. Kennedy, supra) or take such stock
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as a compromise to avoid apprehended loss. Nat'l Bank v. Case, 99 U. S.
628, 25 L. Ed. 448. Also that a national bank may enter into a contract
~ith the promoter of a building corporation subscribing for stock in the
corporation, which the promoter agreed to repurchase later, where the contract was made as a part of a transaction looking to the securing of adequate
and suitable banking offices. Nashville Nat'l Bank v. Stahlman, 178 S. W.
942, 132 Tenn. 367. A national bank may purchase and hold only such real
rstate as is necessary for its immediate accommodation in the transaction of
its banking business (U. S. RJW. STAT. §5137), but under this statute such
bank has been held to have the power to erect a building for its own use,
and in so doing is not limited to the construction of a building to be used
solely for its banking quarters (Brown v. Schleier, u8 Fed. g81, 55 C. C. A.
475), but may erect a larger building than it requires and rent the space
it does not occupy. Wingert v. National Bank, 175 Fed. 739.
Cases involving the implied power of corporations to provide for pension
funds, insurance plans, and such welfare work are relatively few. An implied
power will be ascribed to a corporation employing labor to incur expense
on account of injuries to their employees in the line of their employment,
Toledo etc. Ry. Co. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill. 188, 95 Am. Dec. 484- And,
it seems, to establish funds for hospitals for the benefit of sick and in;
jured employees. Eckman v. Ry: Co., 169 Ill. 312, 48 N. E. 4g6; Pittsburg
etc. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 152 Ind. 345, 53 N. E. 290; Pittsburg etc. Ry. Co. v.
Co~, 55 Oh. St. 497, 45 N. E. 641; Vickers v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 71 Fed.
139; Ringle v. Penn. R. Co., 164 Pa. St. 529, 30 Atl. 492. So also they may
organize relief associations with a provision for a stipulated sum to be paid
the family in case of the death of an employee in service. Harrison v. Midland Ry. Co., 144 Ala. 246, 40 So. 394; Maine v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 109 Iowa
26o, 70 N. W. 630; State v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., 68 Oh. St. 9,.67 N. E. 93;
Beck v. R. R. Co., 63 N. J .L. 232. It is not ultra vires for a corporation to
use its funds to establish a free library and free books for its employees.
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N. Y. Supp. 718, 17 Misc. Rep. 43.
It does not appear that the validity of a national bank pension fund.
established under the implied powers of the bank has been passed upon
before in this country. In England a pension granted pursuant to the resolution of a bank's stockholders authorizing the directors to pay a certain halfyearly pension to•the family of a deceased president was held intra vires.
Henderson v. Bank, Law Reports, 40 Ch. Div. 170. In considering the question the court deemed evidence that among· banking men the granting of
such pensions was considered good business practice of some importance
as showing it was a business detail a choice of which was permissible. In
Beers v. New York Life Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. Supp. 788, the New York Supreme Court held that the trustees of a mutual life insurance company did
not have the power to agree to pay a retiring president a salary for life in
.consideration of past services rendered by him. The above case is easily
distinguishable from the principal case in that in the former there was no
provision for the pension until after the whole service of the pensioner was
over and the pension was not authorized by the stockholders of the company.
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On consideration of the trend of modem decisions to the effect that, where
the state does not object, a corporation will not be prevented from carrying
on its business details according to good business principles unless such is
clearly ultra vires, and also giving some weight to the growing opinion
among business men that the founding of such a pension fund is a good
financial investment for a corporation, it would seem clear that the decision
of the principal case is correct.
H. S. K.
RECOVJ>RY IN QUASI-CON'l'RACT FOR B:i>NEFI'l'S PROCURl>D BY FRAUDUL'£N'l'

MAfuuAG:i>.-The plaintiff had gone through forms of marriage with the
defendant's intestate, honestly believing she was marrying him, while he
knew that he had a living wife and therefore could not marry. They lived
together as man and wife until his death, and it was not until after such
death that she learned that he had a prior wife still living. In a suit for
money advanced and services rendered, she was given a verdict for both
claims. Held, .that the judgment on such verdict should be affirmed. Sanders v. Ragan (N. C. 1916), 90 S. E. 777.
No question was raised as to the money advanced, the advance presumably
being regarded as evidence of a genuine contract of loan. The appeal was
concerned only with the recovery for the services. It is apparent that the
services were rendered in the mistaken belief that the status of the plaintiff
imposed upon her a duty toward the defendant's intestate; and since, if her
status had been what she believed it to be, she would have owed such services to her husband, her mistaken belief which induced her to render the
services was a mistake of fact which affected not merely the policy of
what she should do, but rather her legal duty as a wife. The plaintiff's
case was made still stronger by the fact that her ignorance of her true
status was the result of the husband's fraudulent misrepresentations. To so
induce a person to enter into a void marriage was an actionable wrong for'
whic)l the wrongdoer was liable in an action for fraud and deceit However, that right of action in tort died with the tort-feasor; and after the
tort-feasor's death, the plaintiff could recover; if at all, only in assumpsit for
the value of the services rendered. Accordingly, the court deciding the
principal ease allowed recovery in assumpsit on the ground that the defendant's intestate had been unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's expense.
When money not justly due has been paid under a plain mistake of fact,
which money would have been actually due if the facts had existea as believed, recovery has been generally allowed. Stuart v. Sears, II9 Mass. 143;
Lane v. Pere Marq1tette Boom Co., 62 Mich. 63, 28 N. W. 786; Simms v.
Vick, 151 N. C. 78, 65 S. E. 621, 24 L. R. A. N. S. 517. And it seems, in
the absence of adjudication on the question, that if the element of :fraud
were absent in the principal case, recovery should be allowed on such facts
far services rendered, in the same way that recovery of money was allowed
1n the cases cited supra. But in the case under discussion, fraud is at the
v.ery basis of the mistake. The general rule is that when one by fraud
induees amther to pay him money not justly due, the person so wronged
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may bring either an action in tort or contract, the former asking damages
on the ground of deceit, the latter asking restitution of benefits unjustly·
obtained by means of deceit. Minor v. Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 55 Pac. 783;
Donovan v. Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334, I L. R. A. N. S. 176; Johnson
v. Seymour, 79 Mich. 156, 44 N. W. 344- When the wrongdoer has by his
fraud procured a benefit in the form of services, there would seem to be·
equal reason for permitting restitution as an alternative remedy for the tort,·
;md this has been permitted in numerous cases; though, by reason of the
fictitious forms of pleading in general assumpsit, some courts have been led
to make an invidious distinction between the claim for money had and·
received and that for labor or for goods. WooDWAF.D, LAW OJ! QUASI-CONTRACTS, §§273-2j7-281.
Upon the precise problem involved in the principal case it may be stated
that the authorities are plainly in conflict. WOODWARD, LAW OJ! QuASICoNTRACTS, §§184, 282; KsN:ER, QuAsr-CoNTRACTS, 318. After a discussion of this conflict in decisions the court in the principal
case concluded that services rendered in reliance upon the fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant's intestate should be treated
in the same way as money paid under any specie~ of fraud, and accordingly
allowed recovery in assumpsit as stated above. This view on the same state
of facts is supported by both textwriters and authorities. WooDWAF.D, LAW
ol! QuASI-CoNTRACTS, §§184 282; Ks£1''r:R, QUASI-CONTRACTS, 318; Po~ v.
Dawson's Curator, 8 Martin (La.) 94; Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 493. Similarly, a slave has been allowed to recover for services rendered in the
mistaken belief that he was not free, such mistake being the result of fraudulent misrepresentations made by his former master; Kinney v. Cook, 4 Ill.
232; Hickam v. Hickam, 46 Mo. App. 4g6; and a girl who worked as a
member of the family was allowed to recover in Boardman v. Ward, 40
Minn. 399, 42 N. W. 202, 12 Am. St. Rep. 749.
However, it must be admitted that the opposite view is also supported
by eminent authorities. In the case of fraudulent marriage, recovery for
services rendered was denied in Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E.
8g2, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721; and in Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 397, 32 Atl. 948,
48 Am. St. Rep. 215, 33 L. R. A. 418; a slave was denied recovery in Franklin v. Waters, 8 Gill (Md.) 322; and a girl who was told that she was an
adopted daughter 'was allowed no compensation in Graham v. Stanton, 77
Mass. 321, 58 N. E. 1023. The chief reasons for denying relief in the cases
of Cooper v. Cooper and Payne's Appeal were "(1) that the tort of inducing
one to enter into a void marriage is essentially a personal injury to which
the benefit obtained by the wrongdoer is merely incidental; and (2) that
the value of the benefits obtained by the defendant is only a single item of
consequential damages which cannot be separated from the wrong itself
and made the sole basis of an action by the person wronged." WooDWAF.D,
LAW ol! QUASI-CONTRACTS, §282. These reasons are best disposed of by
the same writer who says: "In answer to the first, it is submitted that if
a wrongdoer is benefited at his victim's expense, to any extent whatever,
the relative insignificance of such benefit, as compared with the injury· suf·
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fered by his victi.m, affords no reason for denying to the latter the right
to elect an action for restitution instead of an action for damages. As to
the second, it may be pointed out that the plaintiff, in electing to sue for
restitution, does not separate the consequential benefit to the defendant
from the wrong committed by him. The very foundation of the action
for restitution is the fraud of the defendant in inducing the plaintiff to
enter into the void marriage; and the only essential difference between the
action of assumpsit and that of deceit in such a case, is that in the former
the plaintiff seeks to recover the value of the benefits resulting to the defendant, white in the latter he demands compensation for the damages resulting to himself."
It naturally fotlows that the value of alt benefits conferred upon the
plaintiff by the wrongdoer must be deducted from the value of the services
rendered by the plaintiff, for the retention of a benefit is not unjust to the
extent that such services have been paid for. The benefits conferred upon
a plaintiff might be in some cases so great as to prevent any recovery for
services. It should be noted in this connection that it is no more difficult
for the jury to make the deduction when the action is in assumpsit than it
is where the action is in tort for deceit.
H. G. G.

Atsrn~c PUlU'OSI! AS A Jusrmc\r10N FOR Exr:RCISI! oF PoLICI! Powr:a.Whether or not aesthetic considerations justify the exercise of the police
power is a question which has already engaged the minds of the courts, and
which we venture to say witt more frequently be involved in their opinions
as time passes. The recent case of Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 37 Sup.
Ct. 190, sustained the constitutionality of the fo11owing ordinance of the
city of Chicago: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
to erect or construct any billboard or signboard in any block or any public
street in which one-half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used
exclusively for residence purposes without first obtaining the consent in
writing of the owners or duly authorized agents of said owners owning a
majority of the frontage of the property on both ·sides of the street in
the block in which such billboard or signboard is to be erected, constructed,
or located." The same .decision had been reached by the Supreme Court.
of the State of Illinois, Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Itl. 344,
lo8 N. E. 340, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 488. In that opinion, wherein the ordinance
is ·upheld as a reasonable exercise of police power, the court is careful to
distinguish the facts from those involved in Haller Sign Works v. Physical
Culture School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920, 34 L. R. A. N. S. ggS. The
statute in the latter case was held to have no relation to the safety, ·health,
morals or general welfare of the pU'blic but to have been passed solely from
aesthetic considerations, and was therefore considered invalid.
The Federal Supreme Court in its decision does not find it necessary
to discuss the effect that it would give a statute which had been passed out
of regard for aesthetic purposes, but adopts the finding of the state court
that "fires had been started in the accumulation of combustible material
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which gathered about such billboards; that offensive and insanitary accumulations are habitually found about them, and that they afford a convenient
concealment and shield for immoral practices, and for loiterers and criminals." It is apparent however that these are not the only objections to
billboards; they form convenient arguments for sustaining the validity of
regulations passed under the police power, as a relation can be shown between the purpose of such statutes and the "health, morals, and safety of
ftie public." If the ordinance in question had also provided, as is done in
'some cities, that billboards must be constructed of sheet-iron or some other'
non-inflammaible materials, and that there must be a space of at least four
feet between the lower edge and the ground (St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co. v. St. LQuiS, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929) there would then be little
danger from fire, the accumulation of waste matter would be lessened, and
the danger of the use of such billboards as a scene of immoral practices
and as a hiding place for criminals would be eliminated. The Federal Supreme Court y;ould have then been called upon to determine whether the
police power may be constitutionally exercised in the restraint of acts offensive to the aesthetic sense-a question which as yet it has not found
necessary to decide. However conveniently and satisfactorily the decision
may have been reached on the grounds assigned in the opinion, it would seem
that the purpose prompting the passing of this ordinance was not so much
the protection of adjoining owners from fires, criminals, etc., but rather
to give them the power to refuse to permit billboards to be ere<:ted in close
proximity to their residences if they found that such billboards were eyesores and as such impaired the enjoyment of their property or lessened the
market value of the same.
The authorities on this question seem to be almost unanimous in holding
that aesthetic considerations alone will not justify the exercise of the police
power. State v. Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123, 128 Am. St. Rep. 670;
People ex rel. Wineburgh Adv. Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17,
21 L. R. A. N. S. 735 with case-note; Haller Sign Co. v. Physical Culture
School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920, 34 L. R. A. N. S. 998 with case-note.
The authorities are also clear on the proposition that private property
cannot be taken under the power of eminent domain if the only public purpose is an aesthetic one. Where a harbor line was established solely in order
that an expensive and sightly bridge might not be hidden from view by
buildings placed on each side of it, the court held that this was not a public
purpose for which lands could be taken. Farut Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, 6o
Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 561, 13 L. R. A. 590. Massachusetts passed a statute limiting the height of buildings in the neighborhood of Copley Square in Boston
to ninety feet, but it was provided that compensation should be made to all
those sustaining damages to their property by reason of the limitation of
height of buildings prescnl>ed by the act. The court in sustaining the statute
stated: "It is argued by the. defendants that the legislature, in passing this
statute, was seeking to preserve the architectural symmetry of Copley Square.
If this is a fact, and if the statute is mer~ly for the benefit of individual
property owners, the purpose does not justify the taking of a right in land
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against the will of the owner. But if the legislature, for the benefit of the
public, was seeking to promote the beauty and attractiveness of a public park
in the capital of the commonwealth, and to prevent unreasonable encroachments upon the light and air which it had previously received, we cannot
say that the lawmaking power might not determine that this was a matter
of such public interest as to call for an expendiure of public money, and to
justify the taking of private property." The power of eminent domain
cannot be used for a private purpose, and "if the statute is merely for benefit
ot individual property owners," proposing to use the public funds to limit
the height of adjacent buildii~gs and thus increase the value of private
property, it would unquestionably be an improper use of the power of eminent' domain. See Welsh v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, n8 Am. St.
Rep. 523, 23 L. R A. N. S. n6o, affirmed in 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567,
53 L. Ed. 923; Commonwealth v. Boston"Adv. Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E.
6or, 6g L. R A. 817, 108 Am. St. Rep. 494Taxes levied to secure funds for the erection of art museums, monuments, fountains, ornamental arches, and other purposes that would appeal
only to the aesthetic sense have been upheld. If the object to be thus.accomplished is considered so essentially public as to justify the exercise of
the taxing power of the state, why could not it also be said that private
property is taken for a public purpose, and therefore it may be condemned
through the exercise of eminent domain, where the purpose of taking is "to
preserve the architectural symmetry of ·Copley Square?"
To recur again to the question of whether or not under the police power
a state might forbid objectionable billboards solely through the fact that
they are offensive to the aesthetic sense, it will require no citation of cases
to demonstrate the fact that an ordinance is consitutional which so limits
my neighbor's right to use his property as not to offend my sense of hearing,
e. g., an ordinance prohibiting. manufacturing plants in a residence district;
likewise an ordinance which protects my sense of smell, e. g., a prohibition
against the location of a livery-stable within a residence-block; my sense of
taste is also protected, e. g., an upper riparian owner cannot so pollute the
water as to make it less fit for my use when it shall have descended to me.
Inasmuch as property in a res is not an absolute right to use the res in any
conceivable way, but a right ·to its use only in conformity with what is
regarded as proper and reasonable under the limits fixed for us by our
compact with society, why cannot society just as it has protected our sense
of hearing, smell and taste, also guard our sense of sight from being disturbed by scenes that are as offensive to the eye as the forbidden noises are
to the ear? fuuND, PoLICt Pow:ER, 182. The application of the maxim, "Sic
utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas," is gradually but surely being extended,
and restraints on the use of property are now being submitted to without
question which formerly might have been successfully opposed as a· deprivation of property without due process. As civilization advances, the social
compact must bring us into a closer relation one with another and our
rights must become more and more limited as they will more and more
co~e in conflict with equal or higher rights 0£ our neighbor. With the
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progress of the people in education and refinement we may expect the appreciation of the beautiful to be increased, and we can agree with the view
taken by the Massachusetts court in a later decision : "It may be that in
the development of a higher civilization, the culture and refinement of the
people has reached the point where the educational value of the Fine Arts,
as expressed and embodied in architectural symmetry and harmony, is so
well recognized as to give sanction, under some circumstances, to the ex_ercise of this power even· for such purposes." Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md.
"220, 23 L. R. A. N. S. n63, 129 Am. St. Rep. 432, 70 Atl. n3, 15 A. & E..
Ann. Cas. 1048. The weight of authority, however, as well as the decision
in that case, is opposed to permitting the exercise of the police power in
restraint of the use of property upon mere aesthetic considerations, and
until public opinion has changed so as to support or demand such a decision,
we may expect the courts to hold that the owner's right to use his land for
the erection of billboards is more to be protected than his neighbor's right
to a view unimpaired by. such ogstructions.
W. L. 0.

WHEN RtMAINDl!RS ARS VtsTtD AND WHF.N CoNTINGENT.-A settlement
was made upon C for life, then upon Ch C for life, and thereafter to the
use "of the eldest son of the said C, wife of the said Ch C, who shall
b_e living at the time of the decease of the survivor of them, the said C
and Ch C" for life, and "from and after the decease of such eldest son, to
the use and behoof of the next eldest son * * * who shall be living at the
time of the decease of the son so dying." Held: That the sons of C took,
under the settlement, successive vested estates for life and not contingent
life estates, and that, accordingly, the limitations to such sons were not void
for violating the rule against perpetuities. In re Barbre's Settlement, 85
L. J. Ch. 683.
There is a well known rule of law that if possible all remainders will be
regarded as vested rather than contingent. Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jae. 415.
This rule or policy undoubtedly influenced this court in deciding the instant
case as it did, and the only proper inquiry is whether it so influenced the
court that the decision contravenes other and more definite rules of law:
It has been said .that "a remainder is vested in A, when, throughout its
continuance, A, or A and his heirs, have the right to the immediate posses._
sion, whenever and however the preceding freehold estates may determine;
a remainder is contingent, if, in order for it to come into possession, the full
fillment of some condition precedent other than the determination of the
preceding freehold estates is necessary." GRAY, Ruu AGAINST PERPtTUTIES.
(3rd. Ed.) §101. This condition precedent, other than the determiiiation of
the preceding freehold estates, which must be fulfilled before a contingent
estate becomes vested, may be either the ascertainment of who is to be the
remainder-man, or the happening of an event which must transpire before
there be any possibility of the contingent remainder coming into possession
should the preceding freehold estate cease. In other words an uncertainty
of (1) person or (2) event may make the remainder contingent. Doe. d.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

506

Planner v. Scudamore, 2 B. & P. 28g, 126 Eng. Rut. Cas. 1287; Boraston's Case,
3 Co. Rep. I!)a, 76 Eng. Rut. Cas. 668; Starnes v. Hill, II2 N. C. I, 9, 16

s. E.

IOII.

There is a definition of what should constitute a vested remainder which.....:.
had it withstood criticism-would have made the decision of this case right
beyond question. This is that provided there is a person in being, whether
or not it be known just who he is, who would have an immediate right to
the possession of the lands on the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent
estate, his interest is vested. N. Y. Rm. STAT., pt 2, ch. I, tit 2, §13.
Although this definition was sanctioned by Chancellor K:eNT, it is manifestly
erroneous in not ntaking necessary a certainty as to who the remainder-man
is, and after ~ome little recognition it has come to be regarded as erroneous.
4 K:eNT. Coi.m. (12th Ed.) 203; Crorall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268; Kumpe v.
Coons, 63 Ala, 448; Ginclrat v. Western Ry., g6 Ala. 162, II So. 372;. Smith
v. West, 103 Itl. 332, (overruled in Temple v. Scott, 143 Itl. 290, 32 N. E. 366;
Chapin v. Crow, 147 Itl. 219, 37 Am. St. Rep. 213, 35 N. E. 536; error admitted in Smaw v. Young, 109 Ala. 528, 20 So. 370). Yet some statutes still
regard this rule as good.
There is some other seeming precedent for the court's decision. An
English court has decided that, if the description can be interpreted as merely
fixing the period at which the legatees shall take, the legacy is vested and
not contingent Pearsall v. Simpson, i5. Ves. 29, 33 Eng. Rul. Cas. 666. And
an English court has said that where there is a limitation over which, though
expressed in the form of a c~ntingent limitation, is in fact merely dependent
upon a condition essential to the determination of the interests previously
limited, the court is at liberty to hold that, notwithstanding the words in form
import contingency, they mean no more than that the person to take under
the limitation over is to take subject to the interests so previously limited.
In order for this rule of construction to be applied, the condition upon which
the limitation over is dependent must involve no incident but what is essential to the determihation of the interests previously limited. Maddison v.
Chapman, 4 K. & J. 709, 3 De. G. & J. 536, 70 Eng. Rut. Cas. 294. 64 Eng.
Rut. Cas. 30. Does the foregoing accord with the necessities of vested remainders? If it means no more than that the remainder necessarily
will vest through the clearing up of the uncertainties at or before the preceding freehold estates for any ,-eason determine, it may be regarded as
correct; but if it means, as the court here took it to mean, that a description
of a remainder-man is not a description at all, but mere surplusage provided
it contains no incident other than those essential to the determination of the
prior limitation by the death of the tenant, it is at the very least refusing to
construe language used by the testator apparently for some purpose. Probably the former is the proper meaning of Maddison v. Chapman, supra, and the
court in the instant case fell into error when construing it to apply to a
condition which ·contained incidents not essential to every determination of
the previous limitation. Manifestly in the instant case if the prior limitation had failed for any reason other than the death of the tenant, who would
then take would be insolvable, because until such teriant died who should be

NOTE AND COMMENT

the eldest son of C at the death of the prior holder could not be determined.
Returning to GRAy's definition of a vested remainder, which may be taken
as being as nearly final as any which has been promulgated, this remainder
would be contingent for that in the event of some possible determinations
of the particular estate there would be no one with an imme<liate right of
possession. This is true if the testator meant by "living at the death" of the
tenant of the particular estate what those words imply, rather than "living
at the termination of the particular estate." If the court. is at liberty to so
'change his words, where need they stop, and why need or should a person
make a will? See 8 CoL. L. Rtv. 245; 24 LAW QuAR'l'. Rtv. 301; 8 ILL. L. R£v.
225, 309, 404. 639; 5 Mxc:a:. L. Rtv. 497.
'
H. J. C:

